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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper uses the AuerbachKotlikoff dynamic life-cycle model (AK
model) to examine the macroeconomic and efficiency effects of privatizing
social security. It also uses a simple privatization proposal, the Personal
Security System, as a framework to discuss a number of other issues
associated with privatizing social security, including transition rules and
changes in the overall degree of progressivity.
According to the AK model's simulations, privatizing social security
can generate very major long-run increases in output and living stan-
dards. These gains come largely, but not exclusively, at the expense of
existing generations. Indeed, the pure efficiency gains from privatization
can be substantial. The term efficiency gains refers here to the welfare
improvement available to future generations after existing generations
have been fully compensated for their losses from privatization. The
precise size of the efficiency gain depends on the existing tax structure,
the linkage between benefits and taxes under the existing social security
system, and the choice of the tax instrument used to finance benefits
during the transition.
Laurence J. Kotlikoff is Professor of Economics at Boston University and a Research Associ-
ate of the NBER. I thank Jan Walliser for excellent research assistance and Peter Diamond,
Henry Aaron, and Jan Walliser for very helpful comments.2Kotlikoff
When the initial tax structure features a progressive income tax, when
the existing system's benefittax linkage is low, when consumption taxa-
tion is used to finance social security benefits during the transition, and
when existing generations are fully compensated for their privatization
losses, there is a 4.5 percent simulated welfare gain to future generations
from privatization. However, if these circumstances do not hold, the
efficiency gains from privatization are likely to be smaller, possibly even
negative. For example, when the initial tax structure is a proportional
income tax, when the benefittax linkage is perceived to be dollar for
dollar, when the income tax rate is increased to finance social security
benefits during the privatization transition, and when current genera-
tions are fully compensated, there is a 3.1 percent welfare loss to future
generations.
The illustrative Personal Security System shows that there are simple
ways to privatize the retirement portion of theU.S. Social Security System
and to credit workers for their past social security contributions. It also
suggests that privatizing social security could provide more survivor pro-
tection than the current system as well as eliminate much of the current
system's seemingly capricious redistribution between two-earner and
single-earner couples. But the proposal's analysis also suggests that these
benefits from privatization must be set against a possible reduction in
progressivity and a likely reduction in the amount of longevity insurance
available to the elderly through annuities.
1. INTRODUCTION
Privatization of social security is spreading around the world. Chile's
highly publicized and successful privatization was the first in a growing
list that includes, or will soon include, privatizations in Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Bolivia, Columbia, Mexico, Peru, and the United Kingdom. Will
the United States join this club? Should it, on economic grounds? If it
does join, what form might its privatization take?
This paper does not predict whether social security will be privatized in
the United States, nor what form such privatization might take. Instead, it
lays out the macroeconomic issues involved in privatizing Social Security,
uses the AuerbachKotlikoff dynamic fiscalpolicy model (AK model) to
simulate the macroeconomic and efficiency effects of privatization, and
shows, by means of an actual proposal, that the U.S. system could be
privatized in a simple and straightforward manner. The proposal consid-
ered is entitled the Personal Security System. Its analysis will help to
clarify some of the microeconomic issues involved in privatizing social
security.This is not the first paper to consider many of these issues, nor is it the
first to simulate social security privatizations. Feldstein (1995) uses a par-
tial equilibrium framework, and Arrau (1990) and Arrau and Schmidt-
Hebbel (1993) use a version of the AK model to make a number of the
points argued here. The AK model used by Arrau (1990) and Arrau and
Schmidt-Hebbel (1993) takes labor supply as exogenous. This is a signifi-
cant shortcoming, since the efficiency gains from privatizing social secu-
rity arise, in large part, from eliminating social security's distortion of
labor supply decisions. Raffelhueschen (1993) does include variable labor
supply in his simulation analysis of privatizing social security, and his
qualitative conclusions are quite similar to those reached here. But
Raffelhueschen's model contains only two periods, which limits the appli-
cability of his quantitative findings. Like this study, Imrohoroglu, Huang,
and Sargent (1995) use a multiperiod life-cycle model to simulate the
effects of privatizing social security. Although their model is more elabo-
rate than that used here, it does not include variable labor supply, which
precludes separating efficiency gains from intergenerational redistribu-
tion. Nonetheless, their general findings concerning noncompensated
social security privatization transitions accord with those presented here.
2. PRIVATIZATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY
AND THE MACROECONOMY
Most industrialized economies and a good many developing countries
have spent the postwar period dramatically expanding their pay-as-you-
go social security programs. Although this expansion has reduced pov-
erty rates among the elderly, it has also redistributed tremendous sums
from young and future generations, as a group, to contemporaneous
older generations, as a group.
The mechanism underlying the redistribution to the initial elderly is
clear. Generations that are retired or close to retirement at the time that
pay-as-you-go social security benefits are increased receive windfalls.
The mechanism underlying the redistribution away from younger and
future generations is less clear, at least to the general public. The public
understands that expanding pay-as-you-go social security means higher
payroll taxes for current and future young workers, but it also sees the
higher benefits these generations will, themselves, receive when they
retire. What the public misses is that the present value of the social
security benefits that these generations will receive is far less than the
present value of the taxes they will pay once one discounts these flows at
prevailing pretax returns to domestic and foreign capital. Stated differ-
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ently, the public misses the fact that the implicit rate of return paid on
social security contributions in a mature system is far less than the return
available on investments in the international economy.
The public also misses the major macroeconomic effects of these pro-
grams, which are to raise the consumption of the elderly,lower national
savings and investment, and, as a result, raise real interest rates and
reduce real wage rates relative to what they would otherwise have been.
These general equilibrium feedback effects exacerbate the redistribution
from young and future generations to the initial old (see Auerbach and
Kotlikoff, 1987). This is not just a theoretical possibility. As Gokhale,
Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996) show, the dramatic postwar decline in
U.S. savings has coincided with a dramatic increase in the absolute and
relative consumption of the elderly, which, in turn, can be traced to the
U.S. government's postwar intergenerational redistribution.
2.1 Demographic Strains
The fiscal burdening of young and future generations through pay-as-
you-go social security can occur just as well in settings with stable and
unstable demographics. But a baby boom followed by a baby bust of the
kind recently experienced by most developed economies places added
stress on the social security chain letter. Indeed, the United States, Japan,
Germany, Italy, France, and a host of other countries now face the un-
pleasant prospect of either dramatically raising their payroll tax rates over
the next few decades or dramatically reducing their social security bene-
fits. It is this impending demographic/social security crunch, rather than a
real appreciation of the intrinsic problem with running unfunded social
security programs, that is leading politicians to consider privatizing social
security.
Many politicians appear to believe that privatizing social security repre-
sents a painless way out of their country's demographic dilemmas. This
will not necessarily be the case. When potential efficiency gains from
privatizing social security are ignored, fiscal policy is, generationally
speaking, a zero-sum game. Consequently, if privatization is used to
mitigate the prospective increase in the fiscal burden on future genera-
tions, it is likely to do so at the price of a higher fiscal burden on current
generations
1
2.2 Zero-Sum Generational Accounting
Equation (1) makes this last point clear. Equation (1) is the government's
intertemporal budget constraint:
1This statement takes as given the government's projected path of purchases of goods and
services.Privatization of Social Security5
N100 + N99 + N0 + N1+ N2 + ...+ N= G0 + D0. (1)
where N1 represents all net taxes (taxes paid minus transfer payments
received) to be paid in current and future years by the generation born in
year t, where the present year is indexed as 0. N_100 is the remaining net
taxes to be paid by those born 100 years ago; N_99 is the net taxes to be
paidby those born 99 years ago; N0 represents the net taxes to be paid by
current newborns (those born in year 0); and N1, N2, and N0. are the net
taxes to be paid by those who will be born in years 1, 2, and the indefi-
nite future, respectively. All the net tax terms are measured as actuarial
present values.
The term G0 represents the present value, as of year 0, of the govern-
ment's current and future purchases of goods and services; and D0 repre-
sents the government's official net debt (its official liabilities less official
assets) in year 0. The discount rate used to form the N1 values as well as
the value of G0 is the economy-wide marginal product of capital. This
budget constraint tells us that net tax payments of current and future
generations must collectively cover the government's bills, given by G0 +
D0. It also tells us that if the size of the government's bills is held con-
stant, any reduction in the net tax payments of one generation requires
an increase in the net tax payments of one or more other generations.
From the perspective of equation (1), introducing pay-as-you-go social
security lowers the N1 values of those above a certain age, say 40, but
raises the N1 values of those below that age as well as those not yet born.
This reflects the fact that the N1 values include the present value of future
social security contributions minus the present value of future social
security benefits. In our example, since the social security benefits re-
ceived by generations under age 40 are smaller, when discounted at the
internationally available pretax return to capital, than are their tax contri-
butions, pay-as-you-go social security raises their N1 values.
Now suppose the objective of privatizing social security is to lower the
fiscal burden on all future generations, that is, to lower the N1 values for
all generations born after year 0. Also suppose that privatization does
not entail a decline in the government's future purchases, which would
lower G0. Then the government's budget constraint insists that the N1
values of one or more currently living generations will have to increase.
To make this concrete, suppose that the government privatizes social
security by (1) allowing workers to make their social security contribu-
tions to private pensions, (2) making up for the loss in social security
revenue by raising consumption taxes, and (3) gradually cutting benefits
of new retirees. Since retired elderly pay consumption taxes, but do not
make social security contributions, this method of privatizing social secu-6Kotlikoff
rity raises the N values of those who are old at the time of the
privatization. The consumption tax increase as well as the cuts in social
security benefits are also likely to raise the N values of initial younger
generations. The net impact of this is a reduction in the N values of those
not yet born. If, instead of raising consumption taxes, the government
makes up for its lost revenue through official borrowing, but uses, say,
the income tax to cover interest payments on this additional official debt,
the result will be similar. In this case, the N values of the initial elderly
will rise because they pay a larger share of income taxes than they do of
social security payroll taxes.
2.3 The Effects of Privatization on Savings, Investment, and
Economic Growth
According to the life-cycle model, changes in the N values will affect
savings, investment, and economic growth. The reason is that older
generations have a larger propensity to consume than do younger ones,
and younger ones, in turn, have higher a propensity to consume than do
future generations, whose current propensity to consume is zero. By
lowering the N values of initial young and future generations and rais-
ing those of initial older generations, privatizing social security produces
income effects that lower aggregate consumption and, thereby, raise aggre-
gate saving, investment, and, at least temporarily, economic growth.
But privatizing social security may also change saving incentives in a
way that discourages saving. Take, for example, the casethat income tax
finance is used to pay for interest on debt issued to privatize social
security. The higher effective rate of capital income taxation that results
from higher income tax rates raises the price of consuming in the future
relative to the present and provides the young and old alike with an
incentive to substitute current for future consumption (i.e., to save
less).2 Such substitution effects on current consumption may outweigh
privatization's income effects, producing a net increase in consumption
and a concomitant decline in national savings, investment, and, at least
temporarily, economic growth.
Since the savings, investment, and economic growth effects of priva-
tizing social security are theoretically ambiguous, depending on how
privatization is conducted, simulation analysis is needed to understand
the net macroeconomic impact of privatization. Before turning to such
analysis, let us consider other issues involved in privatizing social
security.
2Changes in the relative of price of current and future consumption may also produce
income effects, unless households are compensated for such relative price changes.Privatization of Social Security7
2.4 Are There Efficiency Gains from Privatizing Social Security?
Our discussion of the zero-sum nature of privatizing social security is
abstracted from the issue of economic efficiency. Economic efficiency
concerns the structure of economic incentives, such as the incentive to
consume now rather than later and the incentive to work rather than
take leisure. Since privatization of social security will generally alter
economic incentives, the possibility arises that privatization could make
the economy more efficient. In technical terms, improving the econ-
omy's efficiency means being able to make some people better off with-
out hurting others. In our context, it means making some generations
better off through privatization without leaving others worse off.
Whether or not privatizing social security improves efficiency depends
on the nature of the pre-privatization linkage, at the margin, between
social security benefits and contributions. This linkage could, of course,
be zero. Zero linkage occurs when social security benefits are deter-
mined independent of past contributions or when workers incorrectly
perceive that their additional social security contributions will not raise
their future social security benefits. In the United States, misconception
of the true nature of benefittax linkage seems plausible given the com-
plex nature of our social security benefit calculation.
In a "pay-as-you-go" system with zero actual or perceived linkage,
workers will consider 100 percent of their payroll tax contribution to be a
marginal tax on their labor supply. Nonetheless, in a pay-as-you go
program with stable growth, workers will on average receive some re-
turn on their contributions to social security, a return that is governed by
the rate of growth of the economy. So, on average, social security contri-
butions are not just a tax.
This point notwithstanding, there is no necessary relationship be-
tween the average and marginal returns to social security contributions.
To see this, suppose that the social security payroll tax rate is 15 percent.
If benefits are provided as a lump sum independent of past contribu-
tions, the marginal return from an extra dollar of contributions is zero,
and social security adds 15 percentage points to the total effective mar-
ginal tax rate on labor supply. If, on the other hand, the government
provides, in present value, $2 for every dollar contributed to social secu-
rity above some contribution level, then social security will represent a
marginal subsidy to the labor supplyone that reduces the total effec-
tive marginal tax rate on labor supply by 15 percentage points.3
The smaller is a social security system's marginal benefittax linkage,
This assumes that all workers contribute above this contribution level.8Kotlikoff
the larger are the chances that privatizing social security can support an
efficiency gain. To see this, consider a pre-privatization situation in
which social security benefits are provided to workers independent of
their past contributions, so that the marginal linkage is zero, andwork-
ers view all their payroll tax contributions as amarginal tax on their labor
supply. Also assume that privatization is effected by paying only those
social security benefits owed to existing retirees as well as those benefits
that current workers have accrued as of the date of the privatization.In
this case, the payroll tax will, over time, disappear as a smallerand
smaller number of original retirees and workers with accrued benefits
remain alive. As the payroll tax rate falls, the total effective tax on labor
supply will fall as well. Since the government's distortion of labor supply
is reduced over time, this method of privatizing social security has the
potential of improving economic efficiency.
Note that lowering effective marginal tax rates on labor supply can
also be accomplished under the existing social security system by simply
tightening the link between benefits received and contributions paid;
that is, the fact that social security is financed at the macrolevel on a pay-
as-you-go basis does not preclude establishing a tightand transparent
linkage between social security benefits and contributionsa linkage
that, at the margin, can, as mentioned, even entail an effective subsidy
to labor supply.4
Privatizing social security can also reduce economic efficiency. To see
this, take the case that social security subsidizes labor supply at the
margin and thereby reduces the total effective marginal labor income tax
rate. In this case, privatizing social security in the manner justdescribed
will eliminate this marginal subsidy, raising the effective marginal tax on
labor supply and reducing economic efficiency.
In addition to its impact on effective marginal tax rates on labor sup-
ply, privatization may also alter othereffective marginal tax rates. For
example, if privatization is accomplished by using income tax finance to
pay, over time, the accrued benefits owed to currentretirees and work-
ers with no subsequent benefit accrual, therewill be a temporary in-
crease in effective marginal capital income taxation.If effective marginal
capital income taxation is already quite high due to, say, a high corporate
income tax, privatization could well reduce economic efficiency.
Thus, there is no guarantee that privatizing social security will im-
prove economic efficiency. It all depends on the typeof social security
For an analysis of the efficiency gains from tightening the linkage between social security
benefits and contributions, see Chapter 10 in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).Privatization of Social Security9
system being privatized, the nature of other fiscal distortions, and the
manner in which privatization takes place.
3. ILLUSTRATING SOCIAL SECURITY
PRIVATIZATION EFFECTS WITH THE AUERBACH-
KOTLIKOFF MODEL
The AuerbachKotlikoff (AK) model can provide some sense of the po-
tential saving, investment, and growth effects of privatizing social secu-
rity.5 The AK model calculates the time path of all economic variables in
its economy over a 150-year period. The model has 55 overlapping gen-
erations. Each adult agent in the model lives for 55 years (from age 20 to
age 75).
There are three sectors: households, firms, and the government.
Households (adult agents) decide how much to work and how much to
save based on the after-tax wages and after-tax rates of return they can
earn in the present and the future on their labor supply and savings,
respectively. The work decision involves not only deciding how much to
work in those years that one is working, but also when to retire. The AK
model's consumption and leisure preferences that underlie these deci-
sions were chosen in light of evidence on actual labor supply and saving
behavior.
As agents age in the model, they experience a realistic profile of in-
creases in wages. This agewage profile is separate from the general
level of wages, the time path of which is determined in solving the
model. Fiscal policies affect households by altering their after-tax wages,
their after-tax rates of return, and, in the case of consumption taxes,
their after-tax prices of goods and services. The model is equipped to
deal with income taxes, wage taxes, capital income taxes, and consump-
tion taxes. It is also able to handle progressive as well as proportional tax
rates. Finally, and most important for this study, the model includes a
pay-as-you-go social security system in which the perceived linkage be-
tween taxes and benefits can be set at any desired value.
All agents are assumed to have the same preferences, so differences in
behavior across agents arise solely from differences in economic opportu-
nities. Since all agents within an age cohort are assumed to be identical,
differences in economic opportunities are present only across cohorts. In
this study, the model's population growth rate is set at a constant 1
For a detailed description of the AK model, see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).10Kotlikoff
percent rate, with the population of each new cohort being 1 percent
larger than that of the previous cohort.
The AK model's production sector is characterized by perfectly com-
petitive firms that hire labor and capital to maximize their profits. The
production relationships that underlie firms' hiring decisions and their
production of output are based on empirical findings for the United
States. The government sector consists of a Treasury that collects re-
sources from the private sector to finance governmentconsumption and
an unfunded, "pay-as-you-go" Social Security systemthat levies payroll
taxes to pay for contemporaneous retiree benefit payments. There is no
money in the model, and, thus, no monetary policy.There is, however,
government debt, and the model can handle deficit-financed reductions
in payroll and other taxes. It can also handle gradual phaseins of one tax
for the other. Finally, the model contains a Lump-Sum Redistribution
Authority (LSRA), a hypothetical governmental agency that can use
lump-sum taxes and transfers to redistribute among generations alive at
a point in time as well as those whowill be born in the future. The LSRA
can be used (switched on) to study the pureeconomic efficiency effects
of particular policy changes.
Although the model handles a great number of complex processes, it
leaves out large portions of reality. The model's agents are heterogene-
ous only with respect to their age.There are no welfare recipients or
millionaires whose saving and work behavior might differ dramatically
from that of the model's agents. The model does not include savingfor
purposes other than retirement, such as bequests. Nordoes the model
incorporate uncertainty either with respect to individual or macro-
economic outcomes. These and other omissions suggest viewing the
model's results cautiously.
3.1 Modeling the Privatization of Social Security
In the AK model, privatizing social security contributions is simple. It
just requires setting the model's social security payroll tax rate to zero.
Since agents in the model are free to dissave (borrow) as well as to save
(lend/invest), forcing them to contribute to private pensions will make
no difference to their total savingsand consumption; that is, forced
private pension savings will simply crowd out voluntary private savings
dollar for dollar. Hence, there is no need to add a formal private pension
system to the model.
Privatizing social security benefits within the model involves three key
decisions: (1) how fast to phase out benefits; (2) whether to issue explicit
government debt for a period of time to make up for some or allof the
loss in payroll tax revenue; and (3) what tax instrument to use, during
the benefit phaseout period, to pay for benefits that are notfinanced byPrivatization of Social Security11
explicit borrowing and to meet, during and after the benefit phaseout
period, interest on new debt issued as part of the privatization.
These three decisions are illustrated in Chile's privatization of social
security. Chile's privatization honored benefit commitments to existing
retirees. It also provided existing workers with recognition bondsexplicit
lOUs that would come due when they reached retirement age. These
recognition bonds compensated the workers for the elimination of their
claims to future social security benefits, claims that they had accrued as a
result of past contributions. Because the timing of the payment of princi-
pal and interest on the recognition bonds is similar to the timing of the
payment of the accrued social security benefits that these workers would
otherwise have received, the Chilean reform can be viewed as paying off
all accrued benefits under the old system but disallowing any further
accrual of social security benefits. Consequently, it amounts to a particu-
lar benefit phaseout policy. Chile used deficit finance to cover some of
the losses in revenue arising from the discontinuation of the payroll tax.
This deficit finance took the form of running smaller surpluses than
would otherwise have been the case. Finally, Chile used its income tax to
make up the rest of the lost payroll tax revenue and, implicitly, to meet
interest payments on its additional borrowing.
3.2 The AK Model Used to Study Privatization of Social Security
The AK model's steady state from which privatizations of social security
are simulated features a 20 percent income tax, a pay-as-you-go social
security system with a 12 percent payroll tax rate, a marginal benefittax
linkage of zero, zero initial explicit debt, a 1 percent population growth
rate, zero technological change, and a CobbDouglas production func-
tion. Social security benefits equal 75 percent of the average level of
wages earned between ages 1 and 45 (real world ages of 20 and 65). The
intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution in the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (CES) utility function are set at the conserva-
tive values of 0.25 and 0.8, respectively. Households have a pure rate of
time preference of 1.5 percent per year, and the initial steady-state inter-
est rate is 9.1 percent. The base-case simulation begins in year 1 and
involves (1) an immediate elimination of the payroll tax, (2) a 45-year
phaseout of security benefits starting in year 11, and (3) the use of
income tax finance to make up for the loss in payroll tax revenues in
meeting social security benefit payments.
Delaying the benefit phaseout for 10 years ensures that all retirees
collecting benefits at the time of the reform (all those 46 to 55 years old)
receive all the benefits they had been promised. Spending 45 years phas-
ing out social security benefits ensures that all workers alive at the time
of the reform receive some social security benefits when they retire. The12Kotlikoff
phaseout of benefits is linear over the 45-year period, but more rapid or
slower phaseouts can be considered. In terms of the Chilean pri-
vatization, the rapidity of the benefit phaseout captures the choiceof
discount rate, survival rates, and other factors used in determining the
size of recognition bonds given to existing workers.
The reduction in the payroll tax burden facing future generations com-
bines with the increase in the real wage to raise the utility of those born
in the long run by 9.7 percent. This is a very significant long-runwelfare
improvement, but it comes at a price. As the lower panel in Figure 1
shows, initial generations are made worse off; 30-year olds suffer the
largest percent reduction in their remaining utility, 2.0 percent.
3.3 Can Privatization Improve Economic Efficiency?
The utility changes in Figure 1 beg the question of whether, in the course
of privatizing social security, initial generations can be compensated by
future generations, leaving them no worse off and future generations
better off. Such an outcome, referred to as a Pareto improvement, is clearly
more efficient than the initial steady-state status quo.
Figure 2 answers this question in the affirmative. It shows the results
of running the base-case privatization simulation but with the LSRA
instructed to redistribute across generations in a nondistorting manner
to (1) leave each initial generation at its preprivatizationlevel of utility,
and (2) leave each generation born after the reform with the same level
of utility. It is important to note that the LSRA's activities arefully
incorporated into the model; that is, the model's agents take into ac-
count the lump-sum net taxes (which may be negative)that they must
pay to the LSRA. Moreover, the requisite sizeof these generation-
specific net transfers are calculated simultaneously with all the other
variables in the model in solving for the economy's dynamic general
equilibrium.
3.4 Base-Case Results
The results of the base case and other nine simulations considered in
this section are presented in Tables 1 to 5. For each simulation, there is
also a figure with two panels. The top panel shows how indices of the
capital stock, output, the wage, and the interest rate change during the
privatization transition. The lower panel shows the impact of pri-
vatization on generations alive at the time of the reform and thereafter.
The horizontal axis in the lower panel indicates the year in whichthe
various generations were born, and the vertical axis provides anindex
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FIGURE 1. Proportional income tax financing of benefits.
tion's remaining lifetime utility under privatization is 6percent higher
than it would have been in the initial steady state. To be precise,the
percent change in utility is measured as a wealth equivalent, specifi-
cally, as the percent change in initial steady-state remaining lifetime
resources needed to achieve the level of utility experienced as a result
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FIGURE 2. Proportional income tax financing ofbenefits: welfare of
living generations constant.
As Figure 1 shows, privatizing socialsecurity in the base-case manner
is highly beneficial to the economy overthe long run. Compared with
the initial steady state, the long-runcapital stock, output, and wage are
52.2, 15.9, and 9.5 percent larger,respectively. The long-run interest rate
is 23.9 percent smaller. The income tax rate,which was 20.0 percent in
the initial steady state, rises immediately to28.8 percent but declinesPrivatization of Social Security15
TABLE 1













govt., government; soc. Sec., social security; LSRA, lump sum redistribution authority; TBL, tax-benefit
linkage; Yprop, proportional income tax; Yprog, progressive income tax; C, proportional consumption
tax.
TABLE 2
Percent Change in Output Relative to Steady State
govt., government; soc. sec., social security; LSRA, lump sum redistribution authority; TBL, tax-benefit
linkage; Yprop, proportional income tax; Yprog, progressive income tax; C, proportional consumption
tax.
over time, ultimately ending up lower than it started, at a value of 17.3
percent.
The message of Figure 2 is that almost all of the long-run economic
gains in Figure 1 from privatizing social security are due to the policy's
redistribution from initial generations to future ones. Whencompensa-





govt. soc. sec. for first Year of transition
spendingbenefitsLSRA TBL5 years 5 10 25 150
Yprop Yprop No NoNo 0.96 1.195.0215.86
Yprop Yprop YesNoNo 0.300.112.378.07
Yprop Yprop No YesNo -5.98-6.05-2.418.08
Yprop Yprop Yes YesNo -7.14-7.85-6.36-1.34
Yprop Yprop No NoYes 6.67-1.33 0.9011.81
Yprop C Yes NoNo 2.783.185.388.92
Yprog C No NoNo 5.236.20 9.7917.11
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Percent Change in Wage Relative to Steady State
govt., government; soc. sec., social security; LSRA, lump sum redistributionauthority; TBL, tax-benefit
linkage; Yprop, proportional income tax; Yprog, progressive income tax; C,proportional consumption
tax.
TABLE 4
Percentage Change in Interest Rate Relative toSteady State
Tax Tax
financingfinancing Deficits Year of Transition
govt. soc. sec. for first









govt., government; soc. sec., social security; LSRA, lump sum redistributionauthority; TBL, tax-benefit
linkage; Yprop, proportional income tax; Yprog, progressive income tax; C,proportional consumption
tax.
9.7 percent, but only 0.9 percent. In addition,the respective long-run
increases in the capital stock, output, and wage are8.5, 8.1, and 0.1
percent, respectively, much smaller than thecorresponding 52.2, 15.9,
and 9.5 percent increases shown in Figure 1.Although the efficiency
gain is small compared with the long-run utility gainin Figure 1, it is













5 10 25 150
Yprop Yprop No NoNo -0.43-0.400.509.52
Yprop Yprop Yes NoNo -0.62-1.08-2.020.12
Yprop Yprop No YesNo 1.080.40 0.51 9.83
Yprop Yprop Yes YesNo 0.69-0.94-3.88-2.61
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FIGURE 4. Proportional income tax financing of benefits: perfect tax
benefit linkage and welfare of living generations constant.
available from other fiscal reforms, such as switching from income to
consumption taxation.
What is the source of the efficiency gain? Is it related to the fact that in
the base-case steady state, the pay-as-you-go social security system fea-
tures zero marginal benefittax linkage? Figures 3 and 4 answer this
question. They repeat the simulations of Figures 1 and 2 but starting
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viewed as providing future benefits with the present value of$1.6 Figure
3, like Figure 1, shows that absent the LSRA's compensationof initial
generations, privatization has very significant positive long-runeffects
on the economy. But as Figure 4 makesclear, once one compensates
initial generations, future generations actually end up worse off; that is,
Figure 4 indicates that privatizing from a situation of full benefittax
linkage is inefficient. Indeed, keeping all initial generations attheir
preprivatization level of utility and producing a uniform level ofutility
for future generations (those born after the reform) entails a quite sub-
stantial 3.1 percent reduction in the utility levels of these future genera-
tions. Interestingly, the long-run values of the capital stock, output,and
real wage are all smaller as a result of privatizing social securitycoupled
with the LSRA compensation policy.
Intuitively, privatization adds, at least temporarily, an additionaldis-
tortion to the fiscal structure, namely that arising from the useof general
revenue financein this case, income taxationtofinance benefits dur-
ing the benefit phaseout period. The temporarily higher income taxrates
distort both labor supply and intertemporal consumption decisions.
Given this fact, the only way that privatization can improveeconomic
efficiency is if the temporary income tax distortion replaces a permanent
social security tax distortion. But since privatization in Figure 4phases
out a nondistortionary social security system, it mustbe inefficient.
3.5 Using Debt Finance During the Privatization Transition
An alternative to raising income tax rates immediately is toborrow.
Figure 5 considers a simulation in which the governmentborrows to
meet all social security benefits for the first 5 yearsof privatization.
Thereafter, the government raises the income tax rate to maintain a
constant ratio of debt per capita. Note that this policy featuresshort-run
crowding-out but long-run crowding-in of the capital stock. The 5-year
borrowing policy mitigates much of the utility losses to initial genera-
tions, leaving future generations with a 7 percenthigher level of welfare.
Waiting for 10 years to stabilize the debt goes too far in helpinginitial
generations and, consequently, ends up making certain future genera-
tions significantly worse off. For example, the generationborn 8 years
after the reform suffers a 3 percent utility loss from the policy. Themoral
here is that short-term deficit finance can help protect initial generations
from adverse effects of privatization, but it is easy to go overboard.
6Again, we know that pay-as-you-go social security cannot on averageand in the long
run pay benefits whose present values equal taxcontributions, assuming as we do that
the marginal product of capital exceeds the economy's growth rate. Butthis does not
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FIGURE 5. Proportional income tax financing of benefits: 5-year debt
finance.
3.6 Using Consumption Taxes to Finance Benefits During
the Transition
Figure 6 shows that the choice of tax base used to finance social security
benefits during the transition can alter macro-outcomes and the efficiency
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FIGURE 6. Proportional consumption tax financing of benefits: pro-
portional income tax financing of general revenues and welfare of liv-
ing generations constant.
Figure 2 with one exception. It uses consumption taxation to pay for social
security benefits during the phaseout of those benefits. Using consump-
tion taxes to finance social security benefits leads to more crowding in of
the capital stock. The intuition for this result is that in using consumption
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maining social security benefits is shifted onto older generations who
have a larger propensity to consume. Figure 6 also shows a larger effi-
ciency gain than does Figure 2. Future generations are made better off by
2.1 percent rather than by 0.9 percent. This is what one would expect
given that consumption taxation is more efficient than income taxation.
As discussed in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), consumption taxation is
significantly more efficient than income taxation because it embeds a one-
time nondistortionary wealth tax. In the simulation under consideration,
the consumption tax is also used only temporarilyuntil all benefitsare
phased outand during the phaseout period, the consumption tax rate
steadily declines. The temporary nature of the consumption tax and the
fact that its rate falls over time may also improve economic efficiency. The
reason is that it provides the model's households with an incentive to
delay consuming until the consumption tax rate is reduced. This incentive
to delay consuming somewhat offsets the incentive to consume earlier
rather than later, arising from the capital income tax component of the
income tax.
3.7 Privatizing Starting with Progressive Income or Proportional
Consumption Taxation
The privatization of social security can also start from steady states fea-
turing other than a proportional income tax regime. If, for example, one
starts with a progressive income tax, with an average marginal rate of
32.9 percent, and adjusts all marginal tax rates during the transition by
the same percentage, one ends up with results similar to those depicted
in Figures 1 and 2. The same is true if one starts with a proportional
consumption tax and adjusts the consumption tax rate over the transi-
tion to cover remaining social security benefits.
The simulations underlying Figures 7 and 8 also start with a progressive
income tax but use a consumption tax to finance transitional benefits.
Figure 8 indicates much greater potential efficiency gains than does Figure
6. In this case, the efficiency gain is a substantial 4.5 percent. As with the
comparison between Figures 2 and 4, the size of the gain in Figure 8
depends critically on the assumption of a zero social security benefittax
linkage. Rerunning the Figure 8 simulation under the assumption ofa full
benefittax linkage produces an efficiency loss of 3.2 percent!
4. PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN EXAMPLE
In the Fall 1994 final report of the Entitlements Commission, Senators
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FIGURE 7. Proportional consumption tax financing of benefits: pro-
gressive income tax financing of general revenues.
Their scheme involves using 1.5 percentage points of each worker'ssocial
security payroll tax contribution to fund a personal retirement accountfor
the worker. The proposal applies to all workers 50 years oldand under.
Like 401(k) and Keogh plans, workers would control the investmentof
moneys in their accounts. Earnings onthe accounts would be taxable


















I I I I I I I I J I I I I I I I
















C CJ (ON-0)0 ('.1 C
Year of Birth
FIGURE 8. Proportional consumption tax financing of benefits: pro-
gressive income tax financing of general revenues and welfare of living
generations constant.
the case of disability or retirement. Unlike 401(k) and Keogh plans,
contributions would not be deductible. The DanforthKerry social secu-
rity privatization proposal leaves social security benefits unchanged,
although other proposals in their report reduce these benefits.26Kotlikoff
Since the combined employeremployee Old Age, Survivor, and Dis-
ability Insurance (OASDI) payroll tax rate exceeds 12 percent, the
DanforthKerry proposal envisions privatizing only about one eighth of
current social security taxes and zero percent of social security benefits.
As such, the proposal's goals are rather modest. Indeed, the most signifi-
cant feature of the DanforthKerry proposal is not in its details, but in
the fact that prominent members of Congress are now taking privatizing
social security seriously. This fact opens the door for a broad public
debate about the merits and demerits of the System and how it might
best be privatized.
4.1 Illustration of Social Security Privatization
In offering such a modest proposal and one that left social security
benefits unchanged, Senators Danforth and Kerry avoided the poten-
tially tricky issue of how to credit past contributions and how to privatize
survivor and disability insurance benefits. This section illustrates a sim-
pie method for privatizing social securitythe Personal Security Sys-
temthat deals with these issues.7 The objective here is not to advocate
privatizing social security but simply to illustrate that certain types of
privatization are easily accomplished. Having an explicit proposal to
consider also helps focus attention on particular issues that arise in con-
sidering privatization.
4.2 The Personal Security System
The Personal Security System is a straightforward method of crediting
past contributions and uses social security's own benefit schedule. It
also separates the survivor and disability insurance programs from the
Old Age Insurance (OAT) part of social security and leaves them within
social security. The Personal Security System privatizes the total (em-
ployer plus employee) contribution to OAT by investing it in personal
retirement accounts (PRAs) for all workers below age 62. The OAI com-
ponent of total OASDI contributions refers here to the ratio of social
security retirement benefits to total OASDI benefits. This ratio would
remain fixed through time at its current value of 0.68. Hence, 68 percent
of current and future projected total contributions to social security
would be allocated to the funding of PRAs.
The OAT contribution for married workers would be divided into
equal shares and invested in two PRAs, one for each spouse. Withdraw-
als from PRAs would be permitted only in the event of disability or the
A version of this social security privatization proposal was developed as part of a Data
Resources, Inc. project on which I worked with Dr. Cynthia Latta of Data Resources, Inc.Privatization of Social Security27
attainment of age 62, which is the youngest age at which social security
retirement benefits can now be received. Contributions to PRAs would
not be subject to federal income taxes, thus maintaining the current
federal income tax treatment of employer contributions. Withdrawals
from PRAs would be subject to federal income taxation. Hence, PRAs
would receive the same tax and regulatory treatment as current 401(k)
and Keogh plans. Indeed, employers with existing 401(k) plans could
make PRA contributions on behalf of their employees to those accounts
as well as to new 401(k) accounts that they would establish for the
spouses of their workers. Self-employed workers with Keogh accounts
could make their PRA contributions to their existing Keogh accounts as
well as to new accounts that they would establish for their spouses. The
PRAs would afford the same protection to surviving spouses in the
event of the death of the account owner as is provided with respect to
current 401(k) and Keogh accounts.
Employers as well as employees would still contribute to social secu-
rity for survivor and disability insurance. The proposal leaves social
security survivor and disability benefits unchanged; that is, these bene-
fits continue to be calculated on the basis of workers' social security-
covered earnings histories.
Each worker under age 62 at the time of the reform would receive
social security retirement (OAT) benefits to the extent that he or she had
contributed to the system before the reform. The benefit would still be
calculated using social security's benefit formula, but the earnings record
used in the calculation would have entries of zero for years after the
reform was initiated.8
For example, the average monthly earnings of a worker who is 35 at the
time of the reform and began covered employment at age 25 will be based
on his or her covered earnings between ages 25 and 35, with the worker's
covered earnings record after age 35 filled in with zeros. Dependent OAT
benefits for spouses of retired workers would continue to be based on the
retired worker's postreform social security retirement benefit.
4.3 Financing the Transition
The reform would obviously reduce contributions to the Social Security
System that are now being used to make current benefit payments and
to build up a significant reserve in the Social Security Trust Fund. This
Gustman and Steinmeier (1995) propose an alternative method of calculating benefits
during the transition to a fully privatized social security system. Their method provides
workers with a benefit equal to the social security benefit they would otherwise receive,
multiplied by the fraction of benefit computation years the worker spent participating
under the current system.28Kotlikoff
shortfall in revenues would be borrowed by the Treasury. Interest pay-
ments on this borrowing would be paid through general revenue fi-
nance. Although the government's explicit debt would increase as a
result of the reform, its implicit social security liability would decline. As
previously described, the macroeconomic impact of the proposal would
depend on the type of general revenue finance used to pay for interest
on the additional explicit debt issued during the transition.
4.4 Discussion
This proposal leaves social security survivor and disability benefits
unchanged. In so doing, it avoids the highly complex problem of deter-
mining the amounts of life and disability insurance that different house-
holds with very different ages, incomes, health status, and other charac-
teristics should be forced to purchase from the private market. It also
avoids having to confront issues of adverse selection and moral hazard
that plague private market provision of insurance, particularly disabil-
ity insurance.
The proposal would be easy to implement. It piggybacks on existing
401(k) and Keogh regulation, thereby avoiding the need for new regula-
tions covering PRAs. In addition, the Social Security Administration can
modify its calculation of benefits for those participating in the Personal
Security System by simply changing a few lines of computer code in the
software that it currently uses to compute benefits.
The proposal's phasing out of social security retirement and depen-
dent benefits based on past contributions is gradual. Consequently,
there will be no "notch-baby" problems in which one age group can
claim to be treated unfairly relative to generations either slightly younger
or older. The benefit phaseout uses social security's own mechanism for
adjusting benefits for shorter work histories. As a result, the phaseout of
benefits is likely to be viewed as fair.
Employers' contributions to PRAs are shared equally between the
husband and wife. This "earnings sharing" guarantees that nonworking
spouses will have retirement income even in the case of divorce. In
contrast, the current social security system guarantees OAT dependent
benefits for nonworking divorced spouses only if they were married for
10 years before becoming divorced. The proposal also enhances overall
survivor protection for spouses. It does so by leaving survivor insurance
benefits unchanged but providing, in accordance with 401(k) and Keogh
regulations, surviving spouses with a first claim on the PRAs of their
decedent husband or wife. In addition, the proposal's earnings sharing
reduces the substantial and capricious redistribution from two-earnerPrivatization of Social Security29
couples and single individuals to one-earner couples that occurs under
the current system (see Boskin et al., 1987; Steurle and Bakija, 1994).
The proposal provides for individual ownership and investment con-
trol of PRA accounts. As a result, workers would most likely view their
PRA contributions as equivalent to private saving, which would streng-
then the linkage between old-age income and contributions.
Since social security uses a highly progressive benefit schedule based
on lifetime earnings, one might question whether the Personal Security
System would be as progressive as the existing system. It might, for two
reasons. First, unlike social security benefits whose federal income taxa-
tion is limited, all moneys withdrawn from PRAs would be taxed under
the progressive federal income tax. Second, social security benefits are
provided in the form of annuities, so those who live longer receive more
benefits than those who do not. Since the poor, on average, die at a
much younger age than the rich, providing benefits in the form of annu-
ities can be quite regressive (Rogot, Sorlie, and Johnson 1992). Indeed,
depending on the rate at which one discounts social security benefits
and taxes, social security's regressivity due to longevity differences be-
tween the rich and poor can fully offset the progressivity resulting from
its benefit formula. These points notwithstanding, the government
could easily modify the proposed Personal Security System to make it
more progressive by matching individual contributions at a rate that
declined with the size of the contribution.
In contrast to social security's annuitized benefits, PRAs would repre-
sent a form of net worth. Although households would be free to pur-
chase annuities after age 62 with their PRA accounts, they would not be
compelled to do so. Most would probably not annuitize their PRA as-
sets. Why? Because the private annuities market suffers from the same
problem of adverse selection as do other insurance markets. In this case,
individuals with a longer than average life expectancy are most eager to
purchase annuities. Their participation in the market pushes up the
price of annuities for those with a normal expected life span (see Fried-
man and Warshawsky, 199O).
Although reducing social security's annuitization of the poor will redis-
tribute to them, the reduced annuitization of their old-age resources will
leave the poor as well as the rich exposed to more longevity risk. Note
that longevity risk can be of substantial economic importance (Kotlikoff
There is of course a significant private market in employer-provided defined benefit
pensions. By pooling together the longevity risks of large numbers of workers who did not
select their employment on the basis of their longevity, employers are able to overcome the
adverse selection that plagues the market in individual annuities.30Kotlikoff
and Spivak, 1981). Although reducing the availability of insurance of any
kind, including annuity insurance, is economically inefficient, it would
most likely raise our rate of national saving by prompting the elderly to
consume less in old age and leave larger unintended bequests (see Auer-
bach, Kotlikoff, and Weil, 1992, and Auerbach et al., 1995).
Another issue is whether some members of the public would invest
their PRA contributions unwisely. Wise investors understand the bene-
fits of a diversified portfolio that includes holding a significant share of
one's assets in foreign as well as domestic equities. Given the propensity
of many defined contribution plan participants to avoid equities and
other assets perceived to be "risky," it is clear that a significant financial
educational program would most likely be needed to assist the public in
choosing its investment strategies. If improved financial education did
not succeed in getting the general public to choose well-balanced portfo-
lios, then the government might limit the choice of investments in the
PRA to a single world index fund.
The Personal Security System or similar schemes are likely to entail
higher administration costs. Diamond and Valdes-Prieto (1994) report
that administration costs of U.S. defined contribution plans are several
times higher than those of the Social Security Administration when
scaled by the number of participants. Since the Personal Security System
proposal leaves social security's administrative responsibilities essen-
tially unchanged, at least for quite some time, the proposal entails
higher administrative costs.
A final issue is intergenerational risk sharing. As Merton (1983)
shows, pay-as-you-go social security, in combination with other fiscal
policies, can be used to pool labor and capital income risks between the
young and the old. Pay-as-you-go social security can also be used to pool
risk between current and future generations. However, since other fiscal
instruments will still be available, such as conventional deficit finance or
changes in the tax structure that redistributes across generations, the
government's capacity for intergenerational risk sharing is not likely to
be greatly affected by the adoption of this proposal.
5. CONCLUSION
The privatizing of social security is spreading from South America. It
could well spread to the United States as politicians grapple with ways
of addressing the fiscal/demographic debacle facing the country. This
paper's simulations of the AK model show that privatizing social secu-
rity is likely to generate major long-run increases in output and living
standards. But unless privatization includes compensation to initial gen-Privatization of Social Security31
erations, these long-run gains will come primarily at their expense. This
said, the pure efficiency gains from privatization can be substantial.
Their precise size depends on the existing tax structure, the linkage
between benefits and taxes under the existing social security system,
and the choice of the tax instrument used to finance benefits during the
transition. When the initial tax structure features a progressive income
tax, when benefittax linkage is low, when consumption taxation is used
to finance social security benefits during the transition, and when exist-
ing generations are fully compensated for their privatization losses,
there is a 4.5 percent welfare gain to future generations. But if these
circumstances do not hold, the efficiency gains from privatization are
likely to be smaller, possibly even negative.
The illustrative Personal Security System shows that there are simple
ways to privatize the retirement portion of the U.S. Social Security System
and to credit workers for their past social security contributions. It also
suggests that privatizing social security could provide more survivor pro-
tection than the current system as well as eliminate much of the current
system's seemingly capricious redistribution between two-earner and
single-earner couples. But the proposal's analysis also suggests that these
benefits from privatization must be set against a possible reduction in
progressivity and a likely reduction in the amount of longevity insurance
available to the elderly through annuities.
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